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THE MONTANA MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
PANEL ACT: ORIGIN, PROCEDURE,
AND EFFECT
Karlen J. Moe
INTRODUCTION
In response to the increasing cost of medical malpractice in-
surance and to the rising number of malpractice claims, Montana's
medical profession lobbied for the protective legislation of the
Montana Medical Malpractice Panel Act of 1977 (Panel Act).1 This
comment briefly reviews the events" which prompted the creation
of the Panel Act and the two Montana Supreme Court casess
which construe the Panel Act. The procedural requirements of the
Panel Act which require that every claimant file first with the
Medical Malpractice Panel before filing in district court, are also
discussed. This comment then examines the effectiveness and fair-
ness of the Panel Act.
I. THE MALPRACTICE INSURANCE PROBLEM
Between 1968 and 1976 the medical malpractice suit trans-
formed from an oddity to a habit. As a result, many physicians
found they could not afford to pay their malpractice insurance pre-
miums. More malpractice suits, larger jury verdicts, lower insur-
ance company profits, larger insurance premiums, and fewer in-
sured physicians were symptomatic of the developing nationwide
problem of insuring against medical malpractice claims.
Analysts still do not agree as to who caused the insurance pre-
miums to skyrocket; lawyers, clients, physicians, and insurers have
all been blamed. According to one analyst,4 insurers entered the
medical malpractice business in the late 1960's and early 1970's
1. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 27-6-101 to 704 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Panel Act].
2. Several analysts refer to the sequence of events from 1968 to 1976 in the insurance
industry as a "crisis." For more information, see generally Winter, Medical Malpractice:
Will Jumbo Awards Spark Another Insurance Crisis? 68 A.B.A. J. 1545 (December 1982)
[hereinafter cited as Winter); J. ORLIKOiF, W. FIFER & H. GREELEY, MALPRACTICE PREVEN-
TION AND LIABILITY CONTROL FOR HOSPITALS (1981) [hereinafter cited as ORLMKOFF]; and L.
LANDER, DEFECTIVE MEDICINE: RISK, ANGER, AND THE MALPRACTICE CRISIS (1978) [hereinafter
cited as LANDER]. Lander states, rather cogently, that "the malpractice crisis was one of
insurance, not of medical practice." Id. at 120.
3. In re The Montana Medical Malpractice Panel, __ Mont. P.2d -'
36 St. Rptr. 206 (1979) [hereinafter cited as In re Panel]; Linder v. Smith, - Mont..-.
629 P.2d 1187 (1981).
4. See generally J. GUINTHER, THE MALPRACTITIONERS (1978) [hereinafter cited as
GUINTHER].
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when the stock market was climbing toward its magical 1000 mark
on the Dow Jones Industrial Average. Insuring against medical
malpractice was then viewed as a "safe" bonanza-the insurers
could collect large premiums, invest them in the rising stock mar-
ket, and reap huge profits even after deducting the cost of covering
malpractice claims.
More insurers entered the bonanza and undercut each other's
prices while relying on the mistaken presumption of a constantly
rising stock market. 5 Typically, as the present insurer raised its
rates, a second insurer offered to maintain the current rate for any
new policyholders. Inevitably, the claims paid out by the second
insurer exceeded premiums collected. The second insurer raised its
rates, and a third insurer tried to enter the market or, as it hap-
pened between 1972 and 1976, the insurers simply stopped insur-
ing the high-risk medical profession.
In the midst of the early rush to invest premiums, some insur-
ers apparently forgot' that malpractice claims usually are made
long after the malpractice occurs. Most insurers used an "occur-
rence" type of coverage for physicians and hospitals. An "occur-
rence" policy provides coverage if the policy was in effect at the
time the malpractice occurred, regardless of when the malpractice
suit is brought. Unlike most types of insurance claims, medical
malpractice may not be discovered until a long time after the mal-
practice occurs. This means an insurer could have to cover claims
even though the physician or hospital was no longer insured by the
insurer.
Four factors prevented insurers from accurately anticipating
the probable cost of malpractice claims brought during the cover-
age period. First, there were too few reliable statistics from experi-
ence to predict the types of malpractice suits most likely filed. Sec-
ond, any monetary prediction in the early 1970's of the cost of
future claims became useless in the wake of spiralling inflation.
Third, the time span between the times when the malpractice is
made and when the suit is filed, called the "long tail," is very un-
predictable. Finally, the stock market's plummet between 1972 and
1976 eradicated any investment cushion the insurers might have
had.
The Teledyne, Inc. example illustrates the effect of these four
factors on malpractice insurers and the medical profession.' Argo-
5. Id. at 191-93.
6. Id. at 173.
7. LANDER, supra note 2, at 118-19. Lander credits Teledyne, Inc. with triggering the
insurance crisis.
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naut Insurance Company was acquired by Teledyne in 1969 and
became a major medical malpractice insurer. Because the stock
market was rising, Teledyne made enough profits in 1973 to offset
its underwriting losses with a net operating gain in 1973 of over
$18 million. The next year the amount and number of malpractice
awards increased as the insurance "long tail" lashed out, hitting
Teledyne with net operating loss of $105 million.' Reacting to this,
Teledyne raised its rates. New York rates rose 200% and New
York refused to accept this raise. Teledyne, on July 1, 1975, ab-
ruptly stopped insuring New York physicians totally and raised
rates of those hospitals that it did not drop.
Insurer after insurer followed Teledyne's example, leaving
many physicians uninsured when they most needed coverage. Al-
most all insurers pulled out of the unprofitable malpractice insur-
ance business when the stock market fell nearly 400 points be-
tween 1972 and 1974. 9 About this time inflation started its climb
upwards and severely diminished the value of all stock market in-
vestments. The insurers' earnings fell from a $1 billion profit in
1972, to $0 in 1973, to a $2.6 billion deficit in 1974, and finally to a
record $4.4 billion deficit in 1975.10
The insurers' actions affected the medical profession and the
malpractice insurance business. For example, hospital accredita-
tion standards were upgraded," and hospitals began to hire risk
managers who analyzed the hospitals' liability potential." Insurers
switched from "occurrence" policies to "claims made" policies,
which provide coverage only for claims made during the policy pe-
riod regardless of when the malpractice occurred. 3
Responding to increased premiums and the paucity of mal-
practice insurers, medical and hospital associations pressed state
8. Id. at 119.
9. GUINTHER, supra note 4, at 193.
10. S. LAW & S. POLAN, PAIN & PROFIT: THE POLITICS OF MALPRACTICE 167 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as LAW].
11. A recent publication suggests risk management plans for hospitals concerning phy-
sicians and patients. ORLIKOFF, supra note 2.
12. According to Orlikoff:
Risk management is the identification, analysis evaluation, and elimination or re-
duction to the extent of possible risks to hospital patients, visitors, or employees.
A risk management program should be a totally integrated program involving hos-
pital and medical staff quality assurance activities, a patient relations (feedback)
program and a mechanism for handling incidents, claims, and other insurance and
litigation-related tasks.
ORLIKOFF, supra note 2, at 32.
13. "Claims made" coverage forces the physician to maintain insurance coverage for
claims made against him after his retirement from practice.
19831
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legislatures for reform. 14 Legislatures reacted by setting recovery
limits on malpractice awards,15 requiring that claimants use pre-
trial screening panels to filter out frivolous claims, encouraging ar-
bitration of small claims to decongest court dockets, and eliminat-
ing punitive damages in malpractice cases.
II. MONTANA'S LEGISLATIVE REACTIONS
In the late 1960's the Montana medical profession sought an
alternative to the high-priced litigation which was causing mal-
practice insurance premiums to climb. The Montana Medical As-
sociation and the Montana Bar Association joined forces and in
1968 drafted their proposal" for voluntary malpractice screening
panels. Under the 1968 proposal, a claimant would get an expert
medical evaluation of the claim by filing with the panel. Unlike the
present plan, the 1968 proposal was permissive, not mandatory,
and the claimant, not the physicians, paid the panel's costs.1 7
The effectiveness of the 1968 proposal depended upon the vol-
untary cooperation of the claimant: the claimant would have to
choose to file first with the panel rather than go to court, and the
claimant would have to opt against filing in court after an unfavor-
able panel decision unless there existed compelling reasons. The
voluntary panels did not lower appreciably the insurance premi-
ums during the five years of the panel's existence.'8 This ineffec-
tiveness and the sharp increases in the number of claims made,
together with the rising damages awards, caused the state legisla-
ture to look again at Montana's medical malpractice insurance
program.
A. The Panel Act
Early in 1976 an eight-member committee recommended to
the legislature that all medical malpractice claims should be sub-
14. LANDER, supra note 2, at 143, states:
In the two years 1975 and 1976 the legislatures of forty-nine states plus Puerto
Rico and the Virgin Islands responded to the malpractice crisis by enacting over
250 pieces of legislation that could be advertised as constituting [malpractice re-
form.] (Only Montana and the District of Columbia stayed off the bandwagon.)
15. WINTER, supra note 2, at 1546, states that Indiana's $500,000 limitation on recov-
ery in malpractice cases is the most protective statute so far, and the statute was declared
constitutional by the Indiana Supreme Court in 1980.
16. MONT. MEDICAL Ass'N. & MONT. BAR ASS'N., JOINT MEDICAL-LEGAL PLAN FOR
SCREENING CLAIMS OF MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY, (1969) (amended 1973).
17. Id. at 3.
18. Note, The Montana Plan for Screening Medical Malpractice Claims, 36 MONT. L.
REV. 321, 327 (1975).
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mitted to a mandatory pre-trial screening panel before the claims
were filed in court."9 The legislature codified this suggestion in the
Panel Act.2
The committee also suggested using voluntary arbitration for
malpractice claims. 21 Arbitration has been an effective substitution
for trial in complex areas such as labor negotiations and commer-
cial transaction disputes.22 Arbitration reduces resolution time,
does not adhere strictly to the rules of evidence, binds the parties
under contract, and is not a matter of public record.2" Arbitration
can be used to resolve technical negligence issues; one authority2'
contends arbitration would best suit small claims. Arbitration re-
mains a viable alternative to trial and is provided for by statute,25
but there is no conclusive evidence that arbitration is used widely
for medical malpractice claims. The Panel Act, however, remains
the primary resolution technique for encouraging settlements.26
Under the Panel Act, a claimant begins a malpractice claim by
filing an application with the panel director 27 and by sending to
the director permission to release all pertinent medical records. A
copy of the application is forwarded to the defendant who must
also release medical records relating to the case. The director
chooses three attorneys and three physicians for the panel.28 A
party may disqualify up to three nominees per application by filing
an affidavit contesting the nominees' impartiality.
Each hearing is informal, and no official transcript of the hear-
ing is recorded. The panel deliberates in secret and decides by a
majority vote of those members present throughout the hearing.
The decision is inadmissible at a later court proceeding, but a wit-
19. MONT. LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (1976) [hereinafter cited as
1976 Report] at 31-32. This was an interim study by the Select Committee on Medical
Malpractice.
20. The Panel Act, supra note 1.
21. 1976 Report, supra note 19, at 31.
22. LAW, supra note 10, at 128.
23. Many physicians prefer arbitration because of its privacy and because they believe
that arbitration awards are smaller than jury verdicts. LANDER, supra note 2, at 159.
24. R. GOTS, THE TRUTH ABOUT MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THE PATIENT'S RIGHTS/THE
DOCTOR'S RIGHTS (1975). The author recommends that arbitration, if used, should apply
only to small claims of under $10,000. Id. at 208.
25. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-6-105 (1981).
26. LAW, supra note 14, at 128, explains that even if the panel is not successful in
reaching a settlement, the panel narrows and defines the issues for trial.
27. Applications should be directed to the Panel Director, whose office is currently
located at 2021 11th Avenue, Helena, Montana 59601.
28. The physicians selected must be licensed to practice in the same specialty as the
physician involved. If a hospital is named, then one of the physicians' positions will be held
by a representative of a similar hospital.
1983]
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ness' testimony in the hearing can be used to impeach that witness
in a later court proceeding."
Panel members must decide if there is "(1) substantial evi-
dence that the acts complained of occurred and that they consti-
tute malpractice and (2) a reasonable medical probability that the
patient was injured thereby." 30 A record of the decision and a brief
description of the claim are filed with the panel director, and the
decision is served on the claimant and defendant by certified mail.
The statute of limitations for filing a medical malpractice claim-" is
tolled from the date the director receives the claimant's applica-
tion until the panel serves its decision on the claimant.
B. Challenges to the Panel Act
Only two cases construing the Panel Act have been decided by
the Montana Supreme Court. The first case, In re The Montana
Medical Malpractice Pane 1,32 challenged the Panel Act's funding,
and the second case, Linder v. Smith,33 challenged the Panel Act's
constitutionality.
In In re The Montana Medical Malpractice Panel, decided in
1979, the panel requested the supreme court to approve a Panel
Act cost allocation of forty percent to the hospitals and sixty per-
cent to physicians. Under the panel's proposal, the Montana Hos-
pital Association (MHA) would be responsible for collecting the
hospitals' share. The MHA contested this proposal because, unlike
the physicians, the hospitals were not required to belong to the
state professional association and the MHA therefore could not
regulate them. The MHA also contended that the forty-sixty split
did not accurately reflect the proportionate costs of malpractice
defense.34 The supreme court, in an original proceeding, denied the
panel's request and found the proposal unworkable and arbitrary.
Because of this decision, the Panel Act is now funded entirely by
those physicians licensed to practice in Montana.
In Linder, the claimant (Linder) did not file his claim with the
panel director. Instead he filed directly in state district court and
claimed that the Panel Act was unconstitutional primarily on three
grounds. First, Linder claimed that mandatory submission of his
claim to the panel interfered with his right to a jury trial. The su-
29. See infra text at notes 47-49.
30. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-6-602 (1981).
31. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-2-205 (1981).
32. In re Panel, supra note 3.
33. Linder, - Mont. -, 629 P.2d at 1187.
34. In re Panel, supra note 3, at 209.
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preme court asserted that the Panel Act was an effective method of
reducing the number of frivolous claims and likened the pre-trial
screening panel to the pre-trial conference.3 5 The supreme court
held that the panel was a permissible interference with the right to
a jury trial and was not a denial of that right.
Second, Linder claimed that the costs and delays of the panel
imposed a substantial and irrational burden on a claimant. The
supreme court stated that in this particular case access to court
was not an independent fundamental right,36 that there was a ra-
tional basis for the delay caused by the panel, and that the delay
was permissible. The court-appointed Master, acting as the su-
preme court's fact-finder, determined that a malpractice crisis ex-
ists in Montana. 7 Finding the Panel Act to be a reasonable re-
sponse to the crisis, the court also found "no impermissible burden
on access."
33
Finally, Linder contended that a panel is inherently biased
against the claimant because a panel contains medical personnel.3 9
The supreme court noted, however, that a panel's decision is not
admissible as evidence in a later trial and that a decision has a
limited effect on the claimant.4 0 The court also ruled that Linder
did not adequately show bias which would violate due process.
The supreme court did find that the first sentence of Montana
Code Annotated section 27-6-704(2) denied a litigant the right to
impeach a witness on the witness' sworn testimony and severed
this sentence after declaring the Panel Act constitutional.41 Under
the Panel Act, each witness testifying to the panel is sworn under
oath. 2 The first sentence of subsection two reads as follows:
"(2) No statement made by any person during a hearing before the
panel can be used as impeaching evidence in court."4 3 A party
would not be given a fair and full hearing if there were no opportu-
nity to impeach a sworn statement. This sentence was properly de-
leted from the Panel Act.
35. Linder, - Mont. - , 629 P.2d at 1189.
36. Id. at 1190.
37. The Master determined that a medical malpractice crisis existed, noting that Mon-
tana ranked number seventeen on a list of states with the highest insurance premium rates.
Id. at 1190.
38. Id. at 1191.
39. LAW, supra note 10, at 126, agrees.
40. Linder, - Mont. - , 629 P.2d at 1192.
41. Id. at 1195.
42. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-6-502(2) (1981).
43. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-6-704(2) (1981).
1983]
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C. The Panel Act's Effect
The Panel Act solves Montana's medical malpractice insur-
ance problem at the expense of creating another. Research indi-
cates that the number of malpractice claims going to trial has been
drastically reduced, but the Panel Act unfairly lays its heavy
financial burden solely on Montana's physicians.
The Panel Act's main purpose-discouraging frivolous
claims- has not necessarily been met just because the bare num-
ber of cases going to court has been drastically reduced. A great
injustice occurs if an adverse panel conclusion discourages a claim-
ant from pursuing a meritorious claim in court. Statistics from a
1983 report published by the Montana Medical Malpractice
Panel4 reveal that the Panel Act may act as a barrier, not as a
sieve, and may discourage all claims, not just frivolous (as inter-
preted by a panel) claims. According to the 1983 report, only one
claim has even been tried of all the claims disposed of by the panel
from 1977 to 1982,15 representing a drop of 88%.' Of the 181
claims filed with the panel director,'7 claimants received a
favorable decision from the panel 23% to 25% of the time, com-
pared to a national average of 30% .4 The Montana Supreme
Court in Linder specifically said that the Panel Act does not im-
pose an impermissible burden on the judicial process, 9 but the
new data from the 1983 report justify a reconsideration of this
possibility.
The full cost of the Panel Act, according to the 1983 report, is
borne by the "health care providers." 50 The report fails to reveal,
however, that since Linder the entire cost is paid only by physi-
cians. The average cost per claim is $2,469 and the fixed (mini-
mum) annual cost is $52,441. 51 These costs are not fairly appor-
tioned among those benefitting from the Panel Act. Because of a
panel's decision, the claimant gets a free expert medical evaluation
of the claim. The defendant gets a free, complete preview of the
claimant's case. All of the Montana physicians get stuck with the
44. MONT. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE PANEL, SUMMARY OF SURVEY OF CLAIMS BEFORE THE
MONTANA MEDICAL MALPRACTICE PANEL THROUGH 1982 (1983) [hereinafter cited as 1983
Report].
45. Id at 9.
46. Id. at 7.
47. Id. at 2.
48. Id. at 7.
49. Linder, - Mont. -, 629 P.2d at 1192.
50. 1983 Report, supra note 44, at 8.
51. Id.
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bill, although most have never been sued for malpractice.2 The
Montana Supreme Court specifically requested that the state legis-
lature address this very problem;58 nothing, however, has been
done.
SUMMARY
As a reaction to the malpractice insurance problems of 1968-
1976, Montana adopted the Panel Act and the Montana Supreme
Court has decided two cases construing the Panel Act. The Panel
Act has effectively reduced the number of malpractice claims but
unfairly requires that Montana physicians alone pay the Panel
Act's costs.
52. A more equitable solution would be to allocate a portion of the panel's costs to
each claimant and defendant involved in the particular malpractice suit. This would lessen
the burden on physicians when hospitals or nursing homes are named as defendants.
53. The Montana Supreme Court suggested the legislature reconsider the Panel Act's
cost allocation in In re Panel, supra note 3, at 209.
19831
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